

Short JetBlue

Target price: \$15.75

Current price: \$20.04 (Short Interest Ratio: 3.89)

Implied downside: **21.4%** with a one year investment period

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The logo for JetBlue, featuring the word "jetBlue" in a bold, blue, sans-serif font. The "j" is lowercase and the "Blue" is uppercase.

Section I

Thesis

Our Thesis

The market is underestimating the effects of JetBlue's weak competitive position

Market View

JetBlue increasing premium offerings through Mint along with Fair Options 2.0 and strong competitive position for leisure / VFR passengers

JetBlue is concentrated in east coast hubs such as NYC, Boston and Florida - 44% of the Company's revenue comes from the east coast

JetBlue has outperformed its expectation for planned savings through a number of initiatives across business units

Variant View

JetBlue does not have the established credibility or loyalty programs to attract business travels away from large network airlines such as DAL, UAL or AAL. JetBlue can attempt to compete with ULCCs but will not be able to offer competitive pricing with the features it guarantees even on Blue Basic

JetBlue's hubs in Boston and NYC are redundant to major hubs of network airline carriers. Hubs in smaller cities like Fort Lauderdale are secondary to ULCCs like Spirit Airlines. The Company only captures a plurality of seat miles in very small, regional airports

JetBlue ultimately has not been able to increase the cost gap between itself and network carriers. JBLU has not gotten closer to ULCCs' margins. It will also suffer from inefficiencies of Embraer E190s in the medium term, and costs will also increase as employees seek to unionize

Typically JetBlue trades on RASM / CASM performance. Guidance given by management for RASM / CASM can fluctuate over the course of the year, and the stock price reacts accordingly. We believe the company is currently trading too much on expectations of margin expansion, fleet upgrades, and RASM capture in a number of high value hubs. In the coming quarters, JetBlue's failure, particularly in its ability to compete with both network airline carriers and low-cost carriers, will reveal itself through the company's performance and push the stock down.

Recommendation: Short with a target price of \$15.75 (Implied 21.4% downside) with a one year investment period

Section II

Industry Overview

Industry Overview


Airline Industry Trends

Consolidation

Maintaining Market Share

- Increased airline consolidation in the past decade has elevated profits
- Top 4 carriers had 62% of market share in 2005 (currently 68%)
- LCCs and ULCCs have taken over 7% of domestic market share from top 4 carriers in the past 3 years
- Airline carriers recently have cared less about maintaining their overall market share and instead focus on profits

Airline Domestic Market Share




Capacity

Airline Travel Increasing

- IATA expects airline travelers to grow at a 3.5% CAGR
- 737 Max grounding causing a temporary decline in capacity
- Expected surplus of capacity once the 737 Max reenters the market
- Companies have been limiting capacity to maintain profit per ASM
- ULCCs increasing capacity to take price conscious passengers

ASMs and Passenger Enplanement




Profitability

Achieving Consistent Profits

- Cost gap compression between LCCs and network carriers
- Management teams are focused on margins over market share
- Low oil prices have elevated profits and margins
- Low interest rates have provided inexpensive financing for fleet upgrades and internal investments
- Recent decline from increases in capacity which has resulted in lower PRASM

Airline Profitability Over Time




Industry Level Dynamics / Competition


Network carriers thrive while LCCs continue to compete on the basis of price



- Focused on high margin business travelers
 - Beginning to offer basic economy seats to compete with LCCs and gain more leisure customers
- Trying to improve the flying experience and offer premium items to differentiate and build customer loyalty
- Hub-and-spoke models get customers “from anywhere to everywhere” without changing airlines
- Less exposed to increases in fuel prices because of their mix of less price conscious customers
- Have decreased cost gap with LCCs making them more competitive
- Strategy is to keep business customers, gain customer loyalty, and expand in the leisure segment
- Very exposed to declines in business travel



- Focused on leisure customers
 - Have price-sensitive consumers
 - LCCs are trying to enter business travel
- Mainly point-to-point model
 - Southwest and JetBlue include a linear system where planes make stops between points
- Strategy is to continue to gain market share in their key airports and expanding profitable flight paths
- Strong pricing advantage compared to network carriers
- Exposed to fuel prices because of their price conscious consumer base
- Facing more competition from the “Ultra Low-Cost Carriers”



Airlines as a Business

Competition

- Historically commoditized product
 - Leisure-consumers focus on price
 - More differentiation with loyalty programs and premium offers
- Thin economic moat
 - Branding and name recognition
- Minimal barriers to entry
 - Relatively easy to enter the airline market
 - Easy to increase capacity

Margins

- High unionization among workforce
- Dependent on extraneous factors
 - Oil prices
 - Terrorism
 - Political unrest
 - Infectious Disease
- Capital Intensive
 - Requires millions of dollars for planes and leases
- Volatile as margins expand and compress with load factors

Regulation

- One of the most heavily taxed industries
 - Taxed at 17% of fare even if charges can not be passed on to the customers
- Heavily regulated by the FAA, DOT, TSA, and state/local governments
 - Receives fines or shutdowns for noncompliance
- 10th most regulated industry
- Has over 59,000 regulations

Volatility

- Very cyclical industry based on economic cycle
 - GDP growth impacts business and leisure travel
- Airline fares and profits are significantly impacted by oil prices
- Exposure to infectious disease
 - Travelers decrease to key destinations
- Terrorism
 - Threats of terrorism affect passenger numbers

A combination of long-term secular factors make the airline industry a risky area for investors


Section III

Company Overview

JetBlue Business Model

How does the company make money?

- 96.4% of JetBlue’s revenue comes from flying millions of passengers within the United States and South America
 - JetBlue’s 6 focus cities account for the majority of their revenue
 - 85% of flights take the customer directly to the final destination
 - Customers mainly book through JetBlue’s website
- Value proposition is to provide a “JetBlue Experience” for customers who have been underserved by other airlines (flyers between frequent business travelers and ultra-price sensitive travelers)
 - Has a Mint Service to provide premium options for customers
 - Targeting business and VFR customers to diversify customer mix
 - Relying on customer loyalty and building a strong brand
- Sells reward points to credit card companies
- Costs are largely related to fuel, labor and maintenance




What is trackable?

RASM - Revenue per Available Seat Mile

- $RASM = \frac{\text{Passenger Revenue} + \text{Other Revenue}}{\text{number of seats} * \text{number of miles flown}}$
 - Load Factor: proportion of airline output consumed (DOT data)
 - Available Seat Miles: aircraft seats flown one mile (DOT Data)
 - Passenger Yield: average fare paid per mile, per person (DOT Data)

CASM - Cost per Available Seat Mile

- $CASM = \frac{\text{Operating Costs}}{\text{number of seats} * \text{number of miles flown}}$
 - Operating costs: largely comprised of fuel, labor and maintenance
 - Impacted by fuel futures, union agreements and block hours
- Competitive Capacity - Airline capacity for the same flight routes
- Negatively impacts load factor and passenger yield



Current and Future Business Prospects

Current Revenue

- Have 6 focus cities: NY (50% of flight origination / destination), Boston, Ft. Lauderdale, Orlando, Long Beach and San Juan
- Network building block strategies targeted growth in NY, BOS and Ft. Lauderdale for higher growth potential and higher RASM
- Product offering building block strategy driving ancillary revenue with JBLU Travel Products, segmentation and loyalty
- Fleet building block strategy to focus on restyling and Mint offerings to capture premium demand and increase RASM

Network Building

Product Offering

Fleet Building

Future Revenue

- Looking to expand presence in Boston, New York and California (expected to add \$100 - 120M in run rate revenue benefit)
- Adding business customers by undercutting competitors on price
 - Targeting VFR customers to smooth demand
- Entering transatlantic market by 2021 with A321LR purchases
 - Looking to expand to the UK and the EU
- Organically growing current customer base with loyalty programs
 - TrueBlue program (5% of RPMs) and co-branded credit cards
 - Historically has had good Net Promoter Score, an indicator of customer loyalty
- Net Promoter Score increasing for competitors (DAL, LUV, etc.)

Current Costs

- Achieved \$257 million in cost savings from structural cost savings program (goal: \$250 - \$300M)
- Tech Ops (\$100 - \$125M): Executed V2500 maintenance control
- Corporate (\$75 - \$90M): Reduced in flight and data center costs
- Airports / Distribution (\$75 - \$85M): Adding technology to increase efficiency
- Embraer E190s account for 11% of capacity but 20% of operating expense despite having an average age of 10 years
 - Projected to remain in the fleet until 2024 (replaced with A220)
- Most fuel inefficient LCC because of Embraer E190s
- Hedges 7% of fuel costs

Tech Ops

Corporate


Airports / Distribution

Future Costs

- Cost savings program can have additional savings in tech ops, corporate and airports
- Fleet upgrades (A220) have potential to decrease operating cost per seat mile by 25 - 30% compared to E190s
- Looking to increase on-time performance with investments in technology
- Has significant purchase agreements until 2025 for 145 Airbus aircraft (current fleet size is 253)
 - Will not be able to participate in new technological improvements in carbon fiber and polyethylene composites
- Increased unionization of workforce (current: 44%, Industry: 73%)
- EU 261 bill damaging transatlantic margins
 - Flight delays over 3 hours result in 250 - 600 Euro payments to passengers (JBLU averages 75 min delays)

Share Price Performance

JBLU share price trades on Capacity, RASM and CASM



Analysis of Key Metrics

ASM

Short Term ASM

- Calculated using average seats per plane, departures and stage length
- Forecasted company fleet purchases and decommissions to project average seats per plane
- Departures were grown at guidance and consensus levels
- Stage length was consensus for 2019 and company's guidance

Long Term ASM

- Company fleet purchases to determine average seats per plane
- Departures were grown based on 2018 rate because of similarities in fleet additions to projected additions in 2022 - 2024
- Stage length was grown due to company's goal to increase transcontinental and transatlantic flights
- JBLU has strong fleet orders and ambitious expansion plans which resulted in the ASM increase

Competitive Capacity (Above Consensus)

Short Term Competitive Capacity

- 737 Max reentering the market (likely Q2 2020)
- Spirit expanding capacity in Caribbean / Latin America
 - Adding 4 gates to Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood
 - Increasing number of aircrafts 23% by 2021
- **Has no pricing advantage in 10 / 12 key routes**
- **JBLU is overpriced on 4 / 12 key routes**
- Recent EBIT margin expansion led to an increase in orderbook across the industry

Long Term Competitive Capacity

- **DAL looking to expand to 200 departures by 2021**
 - **DAL expanded capacity in Seattle against ALK and resulted in DAL doubling market share and cutting ALK's PRASM in half**
- **LUV expanding presence in Florida (19 gate additions in ORL)**
- Cost gap compression allowing network carriers to compete on price and offer basic economy tickets
- ULCCs increasing order books and moving in to key cities
- Increased competitive capacity in NY

Labor Expense (Above Consensus)

Short Term Labor Expense

- Tight labor market affecting workforce capabilities and increasing wages for new workers
- JBLU is looking to expand capacity and requires additional workforce
- Pilot shortage across industry resulting in higher wages and a very favorable collective bargaining agreement


Long Term Labor Expense

- Continued unionization and ratification of CBA for in flight staff
- **Potential for a \$180M increase in wages if JBLU unionization reaches industry levels**
 - **Unionized airlines typically have significantly higher labor costs per ASM (9-17% greater)**
- In a downturn, JBLU cannot change its workforce
- Increase in labor and other expenses from transatlantic expansion

JBLU On-Time Arrival Analysis

On-Time Arrival Performance


JetBlue Airways (B6) (October, 2018 - October, 2019)



- On Time: 73.81%
- Air Carrier Delay: 8.25%
- Weather Delay: 0.39%
- National Aviation System Delay: 7.25%
- Security Delay: 0.05%
- Aircraft Arriving Late : 8.73%
- Cancelled: 1.22%
- Diverted: 0.3%

On-Time Arrival Performance


Southwest Airlines Co. (WN) (October, 2018 - October, 2019)



- On Time: 80.31%
- Air Carrier Delay: 5.78%
- Weather Delay: 0.3%
- National Aviation System Delay: 3.47%
- Security Delay: 0.06%
- Aircraft Arriving Late : 7.59%
- Cancelled: 2.28%
- Diverted: 0.2%

On-Time Arrival Performance


Delta Airlines Inc. (DL) (October, 2018 - October, 2019)



- On Time: 85.41%
- Air Carrier Delay: 4.37%
- Weather Delay: 0.55%
- National Aviation System Delay: 5.25%
- Security Delay: 0.01%
- Aircraft Arriving Late : 4%
- Cancelled: 0.19%
- Diverted: 0.22%

On-Time Arrival Performance

Spirit Airlines (NK) (October, 2018 - October, 2019)



- On Time: 79.91%
- Air Carrier Delay: 3.81%
- Weather Delay: 0.49%
- National Aviation System Delay: 9.44%
- Security Delay: 0.08%
- Aircraft Arriving Late : 4.43%
- Cancelled: 1.67%
- Diverted: 0.18%

Analysis of JBLU Transatlantic Flight Plans

- JBLU looks to expand revenue streams with transatlantic flights
- JBLU has the lowest on-time flight rating of any major carrier which will result in heavy fines from EC 261 which can cause JBLU to pay passengers up to \$700 for flight delays (per passenger per flight)
- Transatlantic Flights are even more competitive than domestic flights
- JBLU is heavily investing in planes to carry out these routes despite an inability to capitalize on the market
- EU Air Passenger Rights apply to all flights in the EU, arriving in the EU (on an EU airline), or departing from the EU regardless of carrier
- Market is inaccurately valuing transatlantic flights as it will shift capacity from higher margin routes to routes with potentially negative margins

Carriers	Late Flights							
	Total Number	Average Departure Delay (minutes)	Average Taxi-Out Time (minutes)	Average Scheduled Departure to Take-off (minutes)	Average Arrival Delay (minutes)	Average Airborne Time (minutes)	Average Taxi-In Time (minutes)	Percent Flights Late
B6	344,393	66.10	22.60	1.11	69.75	152.67	7.94	24.59

























Airline: JetBlue Airways (B6)

Time Period: Thursday, January 1, 2015 to Wednesday, January 1, 2020

Section IV

Fleet Analysis

JetBlue Current Fleet

Embraer 190	60 aircraft	100 seats	 	 	0 orders
Airbus A320	130 aircraft	150-162 seats	 	 	0 orders
Airbus A321 HD	28 aircraft	200 seats	  	 	0 orders
Airbus A321 Mint	35 aircraft	159 seats	   	 	0 orders
Airbus A321neo HD	1 aircraft	200 seats	  	 	84 orders

JetBlue Proposed Fleet

Replacing E190 with A220

- Ordering **70** Airbus A-220s with first delivery planned late 2020
- Original launch customer for the E190 in 2005 and was Embraer's first airline customer for the aircraft
- Average age of Embraer fleet will reach **17.2 years in 2025E**
- A220s will have **~15 more seats** than the E190 and similar amenities
- JBLU management has intentions to use the A220s for transcontinental flights

Adding A321neo

- Upgrading existing fleet of A320s to new configuration with similar technology to the A321neo
 - Phase 2 upgrade - going from 150 to 162 seats in 87% of their A320 fleet
- A321neos will have 200 seats and have a range that could reach CDG and LHR from JFK, although the A321neo LR would be preferential for these routes

A320 Upgrades Will Not Drive Incremental Profits

§ 121.391(a)(4) - Flight Attendants

- Original A320s had 3 crew members
- **Upgraded A320s (at minimum 87% of A320 fleet) must have 4 flight attendants**

“For airplanes having a seating capacity of more than 100 passengers - two flight attendants plus one additional flight attendant for each unit (or part of a unit) of 50 passenger seats above a seating capacity of 100 passengers.”

Financial Analysis - Impact to Costs

- A320 used mainly on mid haul flights for JetBlue with a maximum range of ~2,700nmi
- Additional flight attendant hiring plus one time upgrade costs does not lift marginal costs for the project over marginal revenue
- Even if the net present value of the A320 upgrades project was positive, we do not see why additional seats were added (this only adds ~9 available passengers per flight) to add another crew member to the plane
- Success of other US airlines has been based on raming out depreciation or leasing expense across longer periods of times

A321neos Might Offer Fuel Savings, But Fail to Compete in High-Margin Market

A321neo Not Competitive for Transoceaning

- Upgrading existing fleet of A320s to new configuration with similar technology to the A321neo
 - Phase 2 upgrade - going from 150 to 162 seats in 87% of their A320 fleet (**represents 53% of their entire fleet**)
- A321neos will have 200 seats and have a range that could reach CDG and LHR from JFK, although the A321neo LR would be preferential for these routes
 - **Current A321neo configuration is all economy-class seats**
- Competition (in other words, capacity) in this market is fierce and JetBlue does not have a clear competitive advantage

JetBlue Fleet Look-Ahead

Our estimates for the next 7 years

	<u>2019 E</u>	<u>2020 E</u>	<u>2021 E</u>	<u>2022 E</u>	<u>2023 E</u>	<u>2024 E</u>	<u>2025 E</u>	<u>2026 E</u>	<u>2027 E</u>
E190 Total	60	56	51	37	19	5	2	0	0
A320 Total	130	130	130	128	125	123	122	120	118
A321 Total	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	64	66
A321neo Total	6	21	44	67	100	134	146	153	153
A220 Total	0	1	7	15	34	56	68	70	70
Total Fleet Size (airplanes)	259	271	295	310	341	381	401	407	407
Average Fleet Age (yrs)	10.6	11.0	10.9	10.6	9.8	9.2	9.6	10.4	11.3

This table reflects our view that JetBlue will begin phasing out “Phase 1” A320s in 2022E in favor of purchasing additional A321neos compared to current estimates

Fleet Age by Airline

Current Ages

Network Carriers	13.9 years
Low Cost Carriers	8.6 years
JetBlue	10.6 years

- JetBlue’s purchases of new aircraft will put its average fleet age below 10 years in 2023E per our estimates
- Competitive advantage for Delta has been keeping the MD-88 for nearly 30 years
- If JetBlue remains on the proposed course management is arguing for, **they will retire the Embraer at the average age of Delta’s entire fleet**
- Moving from a 100-seat E190 to a 130 to 140-seat A220-300 aircraft on certain routes is sure to drive some unit revenue erosion
- The planned fleet transition from the E190 to the A220 will increase JetBlue's unit costs due to various one-time transition costs and accelerated depreciation
 - A220-300 will use about 40% less fuel per seat than JetBlue's E190s, while non-fuel unit costs will be 22% lower
 - Total cost improvement of ~29%
 - Quick fleet turnover is not a sustainable business practice. JetBlue will have to fill seats in the newer, larger aircraft to prove them to be a worthy investment

Section VI

Valuation

Relative Valuation

RASM and CASM 1 Year Change - Network Carriers

Carrier	RASM (Q4 2019)	CASM Ex Fuel (Q4 2019)
JetBlue	-1.1%	+1.2%
Delta	+1.7%	+1.1%
American	+2.2%	+3.0%
United	+1.5%	-2.7%

- JBLU's focus in Florida markets have proven ineffective due to lower-cost carriers like Spirit undercutting JBLU and others particularly with VFR (visiting friends and relatives) travel to South America and Central America
- All numbers are adjusted non-GAAP metrics

Relative Valuation

RASM and CASM 1 Year Change - Low Cost Carriers

Carrier	RASM (Q4 2019)	CASM Ex Fuel (Q4 2019)
JetBlue	-1.1%	+1.2%
Southwest	+3.1%	+3.7%
Spirit*	-1.7%	+8.4%

- Spirit RASM decline was driven by softer yields and lower Load Factor, amongst other factors
 - Non-ticket revenue increased +1.7% nonetheless
- Southwest RASM numbers were greatly helped from the 737 MAX woes

*Spirit figures are as of Q3 2019

Relative Valuation

Delta, American, and United versus JetBlue - Key Metrics

Ticker	FY 19 Adj Gross Margin	FY 19 Adj Net Margin	P/CF	T12 P/E	Fwd P/E	3Y Rev Growth CAGR	ROA	ROE	D/E	Dvd Yld
JBLU	10.1%	7.0%	3.6x	10.5x	8.3x	6.9%	5.1%	12.1%	0.48	0.00%
DAL	13.0%	10.1%	4.1x	8.0x	7.9x	6.0%	7.6%	32.7%	1.11	2.80%
AAL	8.1%	3.7%	2.6x	5.4x	5.3x	4.4%	2.8%	-	-	1.51%
UAL	10.7%	7.0%	3.1x	6.5x	6.2x	5.8%	5.9%	27.9%	1.77	0.00%

- JetBlue is being valued by the market **as if it were Delta** - Delta can charge nearly 12% more for equivalent routes versus AAL and UAL due to corporate sales relationships and strong business demand
 - Higher net margin and large increase in quarterly dividend by DAL, but no real reason for JBLU to be fundamentally valued higher than DAL
- **JetBlue does not fit in a niche with these companies** in our view, but is relatively more expensive
 - Proven by weaker numbers in ROE and no dividend yield, yet stock is trading more expensive on a forward P/E basis and also on a P/CF basis than the average DAL/AAL/UAL

Bottom Line: JBLU is being valued as a premium airline despite poor operational performance

Relative Valuation

Spirit and Southwest versus JetBlue - Key Metrics

Ticker	FY 19 Adj Gross Margin	FY 19 Adj Net Margin	P/CF	T12 P/E	Fwd P/E	3Y Rev Growth CAGR	ROA	ROE	D/E	Dvd Yld
JBLU	10.1%	7.0%	3.6x	10.5x	8.3x	6.9%	5.1%	12.1%	0.48	0.00%
SAVE*	14.2%	9.3%	4.5x	8.0x	8.7x	16.0%	6.1%	17.2%	1.13	0.00%
LUV	13.2%	10.3%	7.6x	13.6x	12.6x	3.2%	8.8%	23.4%	0.40	1.26%

- Weak margins from JBLU on both a Gross Margin and Net Margin basis
 - LUV has historically had 31%+ gross margins from operational efficiencies, but was set back in Q3 2019 due to continued delays from 737 Max
 - SAVE has a higher net margin than JBLU, showing that Spirit can effectively win on cost more than JBLU can win on value-add services
- Forward P/E shows JetBlue at the lowest, but we believe this **forward P/E is unjustified**
 - JetBlue in our opinion has higher business risk than AAL but lower financial risk than AAL as shown in the previous slide
 - This is supported by a lower ROA - ignoring amplifying effects of leverage, JBLU cannot earn as much with the same dollar amount of assets (absolute ROA) as SAVE or LUV

Bottom Line: Market values JBLU as being able to compete with both network and LCCs

*Spirit figures are as of Q3 2019 - numbers are trailing 12 months



DCF Model

Key Assumptions

- **10.00% WACC**
 - We believe JBLU's WACC should be above consensus estimates of 8.2% due to a relatively low FY-1 Beta reported this year and a credit downgrade
- **2.75x Terminal EV/EBITDA multiple**
 - Low end of their 5 year trailing EV/EBITDA multiple is ~3.2x, and the market will realize this when JBLU's longer term operations deteriorate once the 737 Max is back in flight

DCF Intrinsic Value

- **\$15.50 / share versus \$20.04 current share price** (market ~22.7% more expensive than fair value)

Forward P/E Multiple Model (non-GAAP)

Current Implied Px / 2020E EPS	7.9x
Our FV Px / 2020E EPS	6.5x
Our Implied FV	\$15.50
Upside / (Downside) based on Fwd P/E multiple	(22.7%)

- JBLU should trade in between AAL and DAL’s Fwd P/E multiple
 - **Lower financial leverage than AAL but higher operational leverage than AAL**
- DAL has a lower overall business risk, yet higher financial risk, than JBLU, and we believe **~1.5x P/E discount** is fair to account for Delta’s superior business model to JBLU

Football Field - JBLU Fair Value

RASM and CASM - 25%

6.9x Fwd P/E (1.0x discount to DAL)

\$16.50 target

Relative Valuation - 25%

6.5x 2020E earnings, ~3.75x Px / 2020CFE

\$15.50 target

DCF Valuation - 25%

2.75x EV/EBITDA multiple; 10.00% WACC

\$15.50 target

Forward P/E Multiple - 25%

6.5x multiple (AAL/DAL combined fair value)

\$15.50 target

COMBINED 1 YEAR PRICE TARGET: \$15.75

Downside: 21.4%

Section VII

Risks

Risks

Risks to our investment thesis involve JetBlue significantly outperforming consensus expectations



- **Harvesting and Expanding Focus Cities**

- Increase seat shares in major hubs (NY, BOS, FL) to the level that other carriers have in their major hubs (up to 75%)
- Enhanced loyalty programs and increasing customer satisfaction
- Growth in Mint offerings and demand to drive higher RASM



- **Structural Cost Program Outperformance**

- Realized \$275M of \$250-\$300M in planned savings
- Has remaining opportunities in tech ops, corporate and airports
- Entry into long-term maintenance agreements with remaining V2500 engines



- **Customer Segmentation and Premium Offerings**

- Fair Options 2.0: Customer segmentation with increased offerings to drive incremental revenue (Blue “SAVE”, BLUE, BLUE “MORE”)



- **Ancillary Revenue Increases**

- Higher attach rates for JetBlue Vacations (above 1.5%)
- Success in partnerships with Allianz, Avis, Budget and Lyft
- Maintenance programs / fleet, management redundancies, airport expenses and sales / distribution programs for cost reductions



- **Decline in Business Travelers**

- JetBlue outperforms the industry during downturns because of their mix in VFR and leisure passengers

Section VIII

Summary

Summary

- RASM decline from either a decrease in yield or load factor due to an increase in competitive capacity
- No moat to defend against network, LCCs, and ULCCs
- Key airports and routes facing price competition
- Transatlantic flights do not provide a good opportunity for revenue growth
- Trading similar to more profitable and successful competitors

Price Target: \$15.75 (21.4% implied downside)

Section IX

Financials

Income Statement - Historicals

Fiscal Year	2017A	2018A	2018A	2018A	2018A	2018A	2019A	2019A	2019A
Quarter	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3
Quarter End Date	12/31/2017	3/31/2018	6/30/2018	9/30/2018	12/30/2018	12/30/2018	3/30/2019	6/30/2019	9/30/2019
Passenger Revenue	6288	1692	1858	1941	1890	7381	1802	2031	2005
Other Revenue	727	62	70	67	78	277	69	74	81
Total Operating Revenues	7015	1754	1928	2008	1968	7658	1871	2105	2086
Operating Expenses:									
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes	1363	417	491	515	476	1899	437	484	471
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits	1887	499	486	515	544	2044	575	576	580
Landing Fees and Other Rents	397	100	110	114	96	420	115	121	125
Gross Profit	3368	738	841	864	852	3295	744	924	910
Depreciation and Amortization	446	117	120	125	129	491	124	127	134
Aircraft Rent	100	24	23	27	29	103	25	25	26
Sales and Marketing	267	67	75	72	80	294	66	75	74
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs	622	142	188	168	127	625	155	168	158
Other Operating Expenses	933	260	260	277	262	1059	286	277	271
Special Items	0	0	319	112	4	435	12	2	0
Total Operating Expenses	6015	1626	2072	1925	1747	7370	1795	1855	1839
Operating Income (EBIT)	1000	128	-144	83	221	288	76	250	247
Other Income (Expense):									
Interest Expense	-95	-22	-22	-23	-25	-92	-20	-19	-18
Capitalized Interest	10	2	3	2	3	10	3	3	4
Interest Income and Other	6	2	3	6	2	13	-1	2	21
Total Other Income (Expense)	-79	-18	-16	-15	-20	-69	-18	-14	7
Income Before Taxes	921	110	-160	68	201	219	58	236	254
Income Tax Expense (Benefit)	-226	22	-40	18	31	31	16	57	67
Net Income	1147	88	-120	50	170	188	42	179	187
Basic Shares Outstanding	328.7	320.6	315	308.7	313	313	305	300	294
Impact of Dilutive Securities	1.7	1.7	0	1.6	1	1	2	2	1.9
Diluted Shares Outstanding	330.4	322.3	315	310.3	314	314	307	302	295.9
Basic EPS	3.49	0.27	-0.38	0.16	0.54	0.60	0.14	0.60	0.64
Diluted EPS	3.47	0.27	-0.38	0.16	0.54	0.60	0.14	0.59	0.63
Growth Rates and Margins									
Revenue Growth						9.17%	6.67%	9.18%	3.88%
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes (% of Revenue)	19%	24%	25%	26%	24%	25%	23%	23%	23%
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits (% of Revenue)	27%	28%	25%	26%	28%	27%	31%	27%	28%
Landing Fees and Other Rents (% of Revenue)	6%	6%	6%	6%	5%	5%	6%	6%	6%
Gross Profit (% of Revenue)	48%	42%	44%	43%	43%	43%	40%	44%	44%
Operating Margin	14%	7%	-7%	4%	11%	4%	4%	12%	12%
Tax Rate	-25%	20%	25%	26%	15%	14%	28%	24%	26%
EBITDA Reconciliation									
Depreciation and Amortization	446	117	120	125	129	491	124	127	134
Stock Based Compensation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EBITDA	1593	205	0	175	299	679	166	306	321

Income Statement - Projections

Fiscal Year	2019P	2019P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2021P	2021P	2021P	2021P	2021P
Quarter	Q4	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Annual
Quarter End Date	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	3/30/2020	6/30/2020	9/30/2020	12/30/2020	12/30/2020	3/30/2021	6/30/2021	9/30/2021	12/30/2021	12/30/2021
Passenger Revenue	2008	7846	1980	2155	2129	2145	8408	2060	2314	2297	2306	8977
Other Revenue	80	304	81	85	85	84	335	87	90	90	89	356
Total Operating Revenues	2088	8150	2061	2240	2214	2228	8743	2147	2404	2387	2395	9334
Operating Expenses:												
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes	493	1885	502	521	500	525	2049	536	562	533	558	2188
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits	586	2317	610	623	621	634	2488	665	667	665	679	2676
Landing Fees and Other Rents	101	462	125	132	136	111	504	140	147	154	121	562
Gross Profit	907	3485	824	964	956	958	3703	806	1028	1036	1038	3908
Depreciation and Amortization	136	521	136	141	145	150	572	158	164	170	177	669
Aircraft Rent	27	103	25	25	26	27	102	24	24	24	25	97
Sales and Marketing	73	288	72	78	77	78	306	75	84	84	84	327
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs	133	614	158	173	163	141	635	161	173	168	136	638
Other Operating Expenses	271	1105	268	291	288	290	1137	258	288	286	287	1120
Special Items	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Operating Expenses	1822	7311	1896	1984	1957	1955	7793	2017	2109	2084	2066	8276
Operating Income (EBIT)	266	839	165	255	257	273	950	130	295	304	329	1057
Other Income (Expense):												
Interest Expense	-16	-73	-16	-15	-15	-16	-62	-16	-15	-15	-16	-62
Capitalized Interest	3	13	3	3	3	3	12	3	3	3	3	12
Interest Income and Other	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Other Income (Expense)	-13	-38	-13	-12	-12	-13	-50	-13	-12	-12	-13	-50
Income Before Taxes	253	801	152	243	245	260	900	117	283	292	316	1007
Income Tax Expense (Benefit)	66	208	40	63	64	68	234	30	73	76	82	262
Net Income	187	593	112	180	181	192	666	86	209	216	234	745
Basic Shares Outstanding	294	299	292	291	291	290	292	287	285	284	283	288
Impact of Dilutive Securities	2	2	1	0	-1	-2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-3
Diluted Shares Outstanding	296	301	293	291	290	288	291	286	284	283	282	285
Basic EPS	0.64	1.98	0.39	0.62	0.62	0.66	2.28	0.30	0.73	0.76	0.83	2.59
Diluted EPS	0.63	1.97	0.38	0.62	0.62	0.67	2.29	0.30	0.74	0.76	0.83	2.62
Growth Rates and Margins												
Revenue Growth	6.08%	6.42%	10.14%	6.40%	6.14%	6.74%	7.28%	4.19%	7.33%	7.82%	7.49%	6.76%
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes (% of Revenue)	24%	23%	24%	23%	23%	24%	23%	25%	23%	22%	23%	23%
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits (% of Revenue)	28%	28%	30%	28%	28%	28%	28%	31%	28%	28%	28%	29%
Landing Fees and Other Rents (% of Revenue)	5%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	7%	6%	6%	5%	6%
Gross Profit (% of Revenue)	43%	43%	40%	43%	43%	43%	42%	38%	43%	43%	43%	42%
Operating Margin	13%	10%	8%	11%	12%	12%	11%	6%	12%	13%	14%	11%
Tax Rate	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%	26%
EBITDA Reconciliation												
Depreciation and Amortization	136	521	136	141	145	150	572	158	164	170	177	669
Stock Based Compensation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EBITDA	323	1114	249	321	327	342	1238	245	373	386	411	1414

Revenue Build Historicals

Fiscal Year	2018A	2019A	2019A	2019A
Quarter	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3
Quarter End Date	12/30/2018	3/30/2019	6/30/2019	9/30/2019
Available Seat Miles (ASM) (Mmiles)	59882	15437	16029	16296
Passenger Revenue per ASM (PRASM \$ Cents)	12	12	13	12
Passenger Revenue	7381	1802	2031	2005
Available Seat Miles (ASM) (Mmiles)	59882	15437	16029	16296
Other Revenue per ASM (\$ Cents)	0	0	0	0
Other Revenue	299	62	80	81
Total Revenue	7680	1864	2111	2086
Consensus Total Revenue				
ASM Build				
Departures	366619	89236	93040	94191
Average Stage Length	1096	1153	1147	1132
Average Seats per Plane	149	150	150	153
Total ASMs (Mmiles)	59882	15437	16029	16296
Load Factor				
Load Factor	85%	82%	86%	85.50%
Yield				
Yield per Passenger Mile (USD Cents)	14.5	14.2	14.7	14.4
PRASM				
Passenger Revenue per ASM (PRASM) (USD Cen	12.3	11.7	12.7	12.3
Available Seat Miles Growth YoY	6.92%	10.07%	5.89%	4.60%
Passenger Revenue per ASM Growth YoY	1.65%	-3.31%	3.25%	1.76%
Other Revenue per ASM Growth YoY	25%	0%	0%	0%
Departures Growth YoY	3.66%	3.71%	-0.69%	-0.70%
Average Stage Length Growth YoY	2.24%	5.01%	5.42%	4.00%
Average Seats per Plane Growth YoY	0.89%	1.07%	1.14%	1.29%
Load Factor % Change YoY	0.48%	-2.12%	-0.18%	0.08%
Yield per Passenger Mile Growth YoY	1.40%	-0.70%	3.52%	2.00%

Revenue Build Projections

Fiscal Year	2019P	2019P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P
Quarter	Q4	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Annual
Quarter End Date	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	3/30/2020	6/30/2020	9/30/2020	12/30/2020	12/30/2020
Available Seat Miles (ASM) (Mmiles)	15917	63680	16253	16931	16976	16777	66937
Passenger Revenue per ASM (PRASM \$ Cents)	13		12	13	13	13	
Passenger Revenue	2008	7846	1980	2155	2129	2145	8408
Available Seat Miles (ASM) (Mmiles)	15917		16253	16931	16976	16777	
Other Revenue per ASM (\$ Cents)	1		1	1	1	1	
Other Revenue	80		81	85	85	84	
Total Revenue	2088	8149	2061	2240	2214	2228	8743
Consensus Total Revenue	2090	8190	2026	2237	2284	2233	8781
ASM Build							
Departures	91307	367774	92502	96445	97638	94649	381235
Average Stage Length	1149		1153	1147	1132	1149	
Average Seats per Plane	152	152	152	153	154	154	154
Total ASMs (Mmiles)	15917	63680	16253	16931	16976	16777	66937
Load Factor							
Load Factor	83%	84%	84%	86%	86%	83%	85%
Yield							
Yield per Passenger Mile (USD Cents)	15.2	14.7	14.5	14.8	14.6	15.4	14.9
PRASM							
Passenger Revenue per ASM (PRASM) (USD Cen	12.6	12.3	12.2	12.7	12.5	12.8	12.7
Available Seat Miles Growth YoY	4.93%		5.28%	5.63%	4.17%	5.40%	
Passenger Revenue per ASM Growth YoY	0.64%		4.35%	0.45%	1.94%	1.32%	
Other Revenue per ASM Growth YoY	0%		31%	6%	5%	5%	
Departures Growth YoY	-0.50%		3.66%	3.66%	3.66%	3.66%	
Average Stage Length Growth YoY	4.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Average Seats per Plane Growth YoY	1.40%						
Load Factor % Change YoY	0.22%	-0.94%	2.19%	-0.23%	0.58%	0.00%	1.19%
Yield per Passenger Mile Growth YoY	0.66%	1.38%	2.11%	0.68%	1.35%	1.32%	1.36%

Revenue Build Projections - Fleet

Fiscal Year	2019P	2019P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P
Quarter	Q4	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Annual
Quarter End Date	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	3/30/2020	6/30/2020	9/30/2020	12/30/2020	12/30/2020
Models							
Airbus A320	130	130	130	130	130	130	130
Airbus A321	64	64	64	64	64	64	64
Airbus A321neo	12	12	15	18	22	26	26
Airbus A321LR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A220	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Embraer E190	60	60	57	54	51	48	48
Total	266	266	266	266	268	269	269
Additions/New Purchases							
Airbus A320	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A321	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A321neo	6	12	3	3	4	4	14
Airbus A321LR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A220	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Embraer E190	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	6	13	3	3	5	4	15
Decommissions							
Airbus A320	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A321	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A321neo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A321LR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airbus A220	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Embraer E190	0	0	3	3	3	3	12
Total	0	0	3	3	3	3	12
Seats per Model							
Airbus A320	161	161	161	161	161	161	161
Airbus A321	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
Airbus A321neo	159	159	159	159	159	159	159
Airbus A321LR	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Airbus A220	115	115	115	115	115	115	115
Embraer E190	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total Seats	40358	40358	40535	40712	41163	41499	41499
Average Seats Per Plane	151.7	151.7	152.4	153.1	153.6	154.3	154.3



Cost Build - Historicals

Fiscal Year	2018A	2019A	2019A	2019A
Quarter	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3
Quarter End Date	12/30/2018	3/30/2019	6/30/2019	9/30/2019
ASM	59882	15437	16029	16296
Departures	366619	89236	93040	94191
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes				
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes (millions)	1899	437	484	471
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes per ASM	0.031712368	0.02830861	0.03019527	0.0289028
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes per ASM % Change	1%	-11%	7%	-7%
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits				
Average Full Time Employees	17442	18029	18384	18528
Average Full Time Employees Change YoY	6%	4%	4%	4%
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits per Employee	117188.3958	31893.0612	31331.5927	31303.9724
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits per Employee % Change YoY	2%	11%	13%	6%
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits (Millions)				
	2044	575	576	580
Landing Fees and Other Rents				
Landing Fees and Other Rents	442	115	121	125
Landing Fees and Other Rents per Departure	1205.611275	1288.71756	1300.51591	1327.0907
Landing Fees and Other Rents per Departure % Change YoY	8%	2%	0%	6%
Depreciation and Amortization				
Depreciation and Amortization	491	124	127	134
Aircraft Rent				
Aircraft Rent	103	25	25	26
Sales and Marketing				
Sales and Marketing	294	66	75	74
Sales and Marketing as % of Revenue	4%	4%	4%	4%
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs				
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs	625	155	168	158
Average Aircraft Utilization (hours per day per aircraft)	11.8	11.8	12.1	11.9
Total Block Hours	2985.4	2985.4	3073.4	3094
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs per Block Hour	0.209352181	0.05191934	0.05466259	0.05106658
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs per Block Hour % change YoY	-4%	2%	-13%	-3%
Other Operating Expenses				
Other Operating Expenses	1059	286	277	271
Other Operating Expenses as % of Revenue	14%	15%	13%	13%
Operating Costs ex. Fuel				
Operating Costs ex. Fuel	5058	1346	1369	1368
Operating Costs ex. Fuel per ASM (CASM)	0.084466117	0.08719311	0.0854077	0.08394698

Cost Build - Projections

Fiscal Year	2019P	2019P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P	2020P
Quarter	Q4	Annual	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Annual
Quarter End Date	12/30/2019	12/30/2019	3/30/2020	6/30/2020	9/30/2020	12/30/2020	12/30/2020
ASM	15917.39896	63679.7561	16252.8358	16931.0981	16976.1524	16777.24546	66937.33167
Departures	91307	367774	92502.0376	96445.264	97638.3906	94648.8362	381234.5284
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes							
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes (millions)	493.4393678	1885.439368	501.503742	521.463878	500.471472	525.2955554	2048.734648
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes per ASM	0.031		0.03085638	0.03079918	0.02948085	0.03131	
Aircraft Fuel and Related Taxes per ASM % Change	-2%		9%	2%	2%	1%	
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits							
Average Full Time Employees	18696	18314.1	18750.16	18751.68	18898.56	18882.96	18863.523
Average Full Time Employees Change YoY	5%	5%	4%	2%	2%	1%	3%
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits per Employee	31370	126563.4675	32530.9224	33211.4883	32869.171	33565.9	131626.0062
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits per Employee % Change YoY	2%	8%	2%	6%	5%	7%	4%
Salaries, Wages, and Benefits (Millions)	586.49352	2317.896	609.96	622.7712	621.18	633.8235471	2482.930195
Landing Fees and Other Rents							
Landing Fees and Other Rents	101	462	125.16945	131.70003	136.05375	110.978396	503.901626
Landing Fees and Other Rents per Departure	1106.158345		1353.15344	1365.5417	1393.44523	1172.527846	
Landing Fees and Other Rents per Departure % Change YoY	5%		5%	5%	5%	6%	
Depreciation and Amortization							
Depreciation and Amortization	135.8	520.8	136.1	140.6	145.3	150.1	572.1
Aircraft Rent							
Aircraft Rent	27.3	103.3	25	24.9	25.8	26.6	102.3
Sales and Marketing							
Sales and Marketing	73.07041168	288.0704117	72.1282694	78.387394	77.4938227	77.99550021	306.0049864
Sales and Marketing as % of Revenue	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs							
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs	133	614	158.075494	173.290683	163.107884	140.982093	635.4561533
Average Aircraft Utilization (hours per day per aircraft)	11.8	11.8	11.8	11.8	11.8	11.8	11.8
Total Block Hours	3138.8	3138.8	3138.8	3138.8	3162.4	3174.2	3174.2
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs per Block Hour	0.0423		0.05036176	0.05520921	0.05157725	0.044415	
Maintenance, Materials, and Repairs per Block Hour % change YoY	-3%		-3%	1%	1%	5%	
Other Operating Expenses							
Other Operating Expenses	271.4043862	1105.404386	267.905001	291.153178	287.834199	289.6975722	1136.589949
Other Operating Expenses as % of Revenue	13%		13%	13%	13%	13%	
Operating Costs ex. Fuel							
Operating Costs ex. Fuel	1328.068318	5411.470798	1394.33821	1462.80248	1456.76966	1430.177108	5739.28291
Operating Costs ex. Fuel per ASM (CASM)	0.083435009	0.084979452	0.08579046	0.08639738	0.08581271	0.085245049	0.085741137

Section X

Appendix

Appendix Links

General Analysis

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Financials


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Analysis of Key Airports and Routes - JFK

- Delta Air Lines makes a \$800M investment in terminal 4
- Delta Air Lines has increased capacity by 400,000 passengers in the past 5 months
 - Plans to continue to increase capacity
- JFK - LGB: Very little competition
 - Not a top 10 destination for JFK but competitors may pick LAX instead of LGB or competitors will expand to LGB
- JFK - LAX: Intense price competition with all carriers having the same price
- JFK - SJU: Mediocre price competition with DAL and JBLU being priced equally
- JFK - FLL: Intense price competition with all carriers having the same price
- JFK - ORL: Intense price competition with all carriers having the same price


Carrier Shares for October 2018 - September 2019

Carrier	Passengers	Share
JetBlue	10,397	36.50%
Delta	9,259	32.50%
American	3,888	13.65%
Endeavor	2,285	8.02%
Alaska	1,465	5.14%
Other	1,190	4.18%



Based on enplaned passengers(000) both arriving and departing.


Top 10 Destination Airports (U.S. Only, Passengers (000))




Source: T-100 Domestic Market (US Carriers).

Analysis of Key Airports and Routes - BOS

- Delta Air Lines identifies Boston as a hub
- Delta Air Lines creates plans to increase departures to 200 from Boston by 2021
 - Potentially flood the market with 40,000 additional capacity
- BOS - LGB: Minimal price competition
 - Not a top 10 destination
- BOS - LAX: Intense price competition with all network carriers having the exact same price (\$237)
- BOS - SJU: Mediocre competition with Spirit providing the lowest cost flight but JBLU currently having the lowest priced non-stop
 - LUV is expanding their presence along this route
- BOS - FLL: Intense price competition with DAL, JBLU, and Spirit all having the same price
- BOS - ORL: Intense price competition with Frontier and Spirit having prices 30% below competitors and DAL and JBLU having the same price



Based on enplaned passengers(000) both arriving and departing.




Source: T-100 Domestic Market (US Carriers).

Analysis of Key Airports and Routes - FLL


- Spirit is adding four gates to the airport to increase capacity
- Spirit is planning on increasing the number of aircrafts by 23% by 2021
- LUV recently finished a new terminal with 5 gates which costed \$333M
 - Looking to significantly increase capacity
- FLL - SJU: Intense price competition with Spirit undercutting JBLU by 30%
- FLL - JFK: Intense price competition with all carriers having the same price
- FLL - BOS: Intense price competition with all carriers having the same price

Carrier Shares for October 2018 - September 2019



Based on enplaned passengers(000) both arriving and departing.


Top 10 Destination Airports (U.S. Only, Passengers (000))




Source: T-100 Domestic Market (US Carriers).

Analysis of Key Airports and Routes - ORL

- LUV has identified Florida as a key geography for further expansion (Southwest Effect)
- LUV plans to add 19 gates to Orlando which will dramatically increase capacity
- Spirit has identified Orlando as a key airport and plans to target the airport in the following years (10-K)
- ORL - SJU: Intense price competition with Spirit and Frontier undercutting JBLU by 40-50%
- All other routes have intense price competition with all carriers having the same price



Based on enplaned passengers(000) both arriving and departing.




Source: T-100 Domestic Market (US Carriers).


Analysis of Key Airports and Routes - LGB

- Long Beach has been a hub for JBLU but may face an increase in competition at the airport if margins remain high
- LAX is a great substitute where customers will fly to achieve lower prices
- Limited competition on the flights due to the size of the airport

Carrier Shares for October 2018 - September 2019



Top 10 Destination Airports (U.S. Only, Passengers (000))




Source: T-100 Domestic Market (US Carriers).

Analysis of Key Airports and Routes - SJU


- LUV is planning on expanding into the Caribbean and has identified SJU as a key airport to increase capacity
- Can decrease yields by 20%+ and significantly decrease the load factor of JBLU
- All routes face significant price competition with JBLU not having the lowest price in any key destination

Carrier Shares for October 2018 - September 2019



Based on enplaned passengers(000) both arriving and departing.

Top 10 Destination Airports (U.S. Only, Passengers (000))



Source: T-100 Domestic Market (US Carriers).

Overview of Sell-Side Market Theses

Bull Case

- Harvesting and Expanding Focus Cities
 - Increase seat shares in major hubs (NY, BOS, FL) to the level that other carriers have in their major hubs (up to 75%)
 - Enhanced loyalty programs and increasing customer satisfaction
 - Growth in Mint offerings and demand to drive higher RASM
- Structural Cost Program Outperformance
 - Realized \$275M of \$250-\$300M in planned savings
 - Has remaining opportunities in tech ops, corporate and airports
 - Entry into long-term maintenance agreements with remaining V2500 engines
- Customer Segmentation and Premium Offerings
 - Fair Options 2.0: Customer segmentation with increased offerings to drive incremental revenue (Blue “SAVE”, BLUE, BLUE “MORE”)
- Ancillary Revenue Increases
 - Higher attach rates for JetBlue Vacations (above 1.5%)
 - Success in partnerships with Allianz, Avis, Budget and Lyft
 - Maintenance programs / fleet, management redundancies, airport expenses and sales / distribution programs for cost reductions
- Decline in Business Travelers
 - JetBlue outperforms the industry during downturns because of their mix in VFR and leisure passengers

Bear Case

- Increased Competitive Capacity
 - Very reliant on NYC area (50% of their flights)
 - Increased competition with Delta in Boston and Southwest increasing capacity
 - ULCC increasing capacity and taking leisure customers from JBLU
- Inability to Hit Cost Reduction Targets and Cost Gap Compression
 - Inability to hit cost reduction targets; and cost reduction initiatives to this point have not increased the cost gap between JBLU and network carriers or gotten them closer to the ULCCs’ margins
- Continued Unionization
 - JetBlue’s unionization rate could reach the industry average (73%) which could result in significant labor cost increases from CBA
- Rising Fuel Prices
 - Increase in fuel prices will erode profit margins
 - E190s remain in the fleet past 2024
- Aircraft Delivery Delays
 - Decreased capacity from Airbus delays for A220 and A321

JetBlue Fleet Look-Ahead

Our estimates for the next 7 years as a percent of the total fleet

	<u>2019 E</u>	<u>2020 E</u>	<u>2021 E</u>	<u>2022 E</u>	<u>2023 E</u>	<u>2024 E</u>	<u>2025 E</u>	<u>2026 E</u>	<u>2027 E</u>
E190	23%	21%	17%	12%	6%	1%	0%	0%	0%
A320	50%	48%	44%	41%	37%	32%	30%	29%	29%
A321	24%	23%	21%	20%	18%	17%	16%	16%	16%
A321neo	2%	8%	15%	22%	29%	35%	36%	38%	38%
A220	0%	0%	2%	5%	10%	15%	17%	17%	17%

This table reflects our view that JetBlue will begin phasing out “Phase 1” A320s in 2022E in favor of purchasing additional A321neos compared to current estimates

737 Max Update

- 737 Max expected to return in Q2 2020, although this tentative date is already later than expected
- Regulators are “pleased” with progress on 737 Max, which caused Boeing’s stock price to jump intraday last week
- Airlines are having difficult times without flying the Max, and the impact should be positive in the short term for airlines with little or no exposure to the Max such as JBLU